with whom one spends one's time. This is not assumed here. Finally, it is assumed that each person's desire to spend time with another person is not dependent upon that person's allocation of time to others. This assumption differs from Boorman's model, where there is a priority rule between strong and weak ties. In summary this model is simpler than Boorman's in that it is nonprobabilistic and assumes no interdependence in the importance of other's relationships to a person. On the other hand, it assumes a much more general situation in terms of people's preferences for spending time with each other.
Becker's marriage model is very similar to the timeallocation model in this chapter. In a sense marriage is very much like allocating all of one's time to one other person. In the simplest model Becker assumes there is a production function associated with each potential couple. The production function summarizes the product of the couple's relation-"quality of meals, the quality and quantity of children, prestige, recreation, companionship, love, and health status" (Becker, 1973, p. 816) . Much of Becker's analysis consists of looking at the way final output changes with different inputs and different production functions. Much attention is given to who should marry whom within this framework. Our concern, however, is in the structure of the marriage market that results from this formulation. The market can most easily be represented in terms of an n + 1 by m + 1 payoff matrix with n males associated with the rows and m females associated with the columns. The last row and column represent the payoff to remaining single for males and females respectively. The ijth entry in the matrix represents the product that will result from the ith male marrying the jth female. The product of the marriage is assumed to be divided among each member. We can think of this division as a second payoff matrix in which there are two entries in the zith cell. There is the share of the product the male receives and the share of the product the female receives. The specific share each spouse receives is in part determined by the marriage market itself. One person gives up a larger share of the product in order to induce another person to marry. Each person marries that person who is willing to marry them and from whom she or he receives the largest absolute share of product. Becker goes on to show that an equilibrium will exist in this situation and that any equilibrium will maximize the total product in all marriages.1 Thus any equilibrium is necessarily Pareto optimal. Becker briefly considers marriages in which the product is not perfectly divisible and interprets these situations in terms of love and caring.
We shall delay further discussion of the Becker model until we have given a full description of the time-allocation model. At that point we shall compare the time model to the Becker model and to more traditional graph-theory models of network theory.
THE MODEL
Our goal is to describe the structure of a time-allocation market. In particular we shall be interested in the existence of equilibria, the efficiency of the allocation, and stability properties. Because of this we shall give a very simple description of how an individual allocates time and how two individuals decide to spend time together. We shall only consider how much time two individuals decide to spend with each other. We shall not attack the problem of where, when, and how people spend their time. The model does not consider issues of persuasion and inducement. The mechanisms by which one person convinces another to spend more time with him or with her are not made explicit. Although these problems are significant, they are beyond the scope of this investigation. Becker does deal with many of these issues in his two articles on a theory of marriage, and the interested reader is referred there. It should be pointed out, however, that failure to make these mechanisms explicit in the time model does not mean that we have restricted our model in any important sense. These mechanisms are implicit in our description. Since we shall be giving a simple description of how individuals allocate their time, there is no need for a comparative statics analysis. Within the present context such an analysis would not be very revealing.
To simplify the notation and exposition of the model we
IThe actual proof is due to Koopmans and Beckman (1957).
assume that individuals spend time together only in pairs-that is, two at a time. Individuals are assumed to act individually: They do not form coalitions in deciding how to allocate their time.2 Individuals will limit the amount of time they spend with others. Individuals see the limits imposed upon them as given.
They cannot change the limits imposed upon them by changing the limits they impose upon others. Besides making these general assumptions, we need to make a number of mathematical assumptions about the set of feasible allocations and people's preferences with respect to them. These assumptions are similar to those frequently used in the theory of the consumer (see Malinvaud, 1972, Chap. 2).
We assume that the set of physically feasible allocations is closed, bounded, nonnegative, and convex. The assumption that the set is convex is substantively important. A set is convex if for any two elements of the set X1, X2 and for 0 < a < 1, X = aX1 + (1 -a)X2 is also a member of the set. Convexity guarantees that for any two points, the points between them are also in the set. This assumption may not always be realistic. I may be able to spend 3 hours with Jim by spending an hour alone driving West to his place, or I may be able to spend 3 hours with John by spending an hour alone driving East to his place. To spend 12 hours with each I must drive an additional 2 hours by myself.
Clearly this situation is not convex-(3,0,1) and (0,3,1) are both physically feasible, but (1 ,1 ,1) is not. In the exposition of the model we make a stronger assumption. We assume that the total amount of time each person has is 1. We assume that the set of feasible allocations is the set of n x n (where n is the number of people being considered) matrices that are nonnegative and have row sums of 1. We let X, represent the amount of time i allocates toj.
Why have we not assumed that the set of physically feasible allocations is symmetric-that X,j = Xj,? We think of Xj not as the actual amount of time that i spends with j but instead as the amount of time i puts aside to spend with j. The actual 2In general the equilibrium found in the time model will not be in the core of possible allocations. amount of time that i and j spend together is the minimum of X, and X,i. If i allocates more time to j than j allocates to i, then i will spend the difference alone.
We also need to make assumptions about people's preferences. We assume that their preferences can be represented by a utility function that is continuous, twice differentiable, with continuous first derivatives. We assume that it is only dependent on Xi: the amount of time i allocates to others. The importance of this is taken up later. Finally we assume that the utility function is strictly quasi-concave. This is a strong assumption. U,(Xi) is We assume that i will choose that allocation of time he prefers the most, which is less than or equal to T.i and is physi-cally feasible. Given the assumptions made in the last section, there will be a unique allocation Xi. that will fulfill these criteria: Xi. will vary continuously with T..3 We let Di, be the function describing the relationship between X,. and T,: X,. = Di. (T.). If we hold all the Tki constant except Tj,, the relationship between Tj, and Xj will take a very specific form. It will start at the origin following the 45-degree line and then at some point become horizontal. Figure 1 shows an example. 
Limits
In the last section we defined a function that related how an individual allocated time to the limits imposed by others. In that section the limits were simply given. In this section we show where these limits come from.
The Mathematically we can formulate this notion in a way that is almost identical to the way we set up the allocation problem. In this case we define a function that relates a person's preferences (U,) and the limits that are imposed upon him by others (T.) to the limits that he imposes on others (T,.). 4 We let 7T equal the amount of time that i would allocate to j if j did not impose any limit on i; that is, Tj, = 1. Thus we have the same maximization process as in the allocation problem, except that in deciding how much time i is willing to spend with j, i does not consider how much timej is willing to spend with him. In determining X, we assume that the X, < T,, constraint does not hold. We define a function T, = K, (T,). From our previous discussion of the allocation problem it should be clear that T, = Kj. That is, T,j is just the amount of time that i would allocate to j if i were not constrained byj in how much time i could spend with him. Since Di. is well defined and continuous, K,. is also. 4People impose only upper limits on the amount of time they will spend with others because we have assumed that their preferences are strictly quasiconcave. No other type of limit would be consistent with this assumption.
Partial Equilibrium
We are now in a position to determine how much time two people will spend together. We assume that two individuals, i and j, take the limits imposed upon them by others as given. From these limits they can calculate how much time they would be willing to spend with each other, T, and T,, respectively. From the last section we know that K,j = T,. From the section before that we know that Xi, the amount of time i allocates to j, is equal to the minimum of K,j and 7Tj or equivalently T, and Tj,. Thus the amount of time that i allocates to j will be the minimum of the amount of time that i is willing to spend with j-7j-and the amount of timej is willing to spend with i-T7i. Andj will allocate the same amount of time to i. Two individuals will spend that amount of time together which is the minimum of the amount each would like to spend together.
This "minimum principle" is closely related to "the prin- In terms of the first two relationships we have specified here, we can think of one person as having control over another. One person has control over the relationship by limiting the amount of time the other person can spend with him. What is interesting about this notion of control is that the control of one person over another is not derived from any intrinsic difference in their abilities to determine the outcome of events. Rather it is due to their different interests in terms of how they would like to spend their time. It is, by definition, the fact that one person has less interest in spending time with another that gives that person control. We shall define a relationship C between two people such that iCj if i has control over j-for example, j would like to spend more time with i than i is willing to spend with j. By definition C is asymmetric. We shall have more to say about C when we consider the problem of Pareto optimality.
General Equilibrium Mechanisms
In (1973) and Grandmont (1975) . spend more time with i than i is willing to spend with j. It seems natural to think of a control relation as defining a hierarchy among a group of people, where people higher up in the hierarchy have control over those lower down. We think of hierarchies here in a very weak sense: A hierarchy exists if the relation C is acyclic.9 We can induce a partial ordering on C by taking its transitive closure. If C is acyclic, it may contain a number of hierarchies. Between hierarchies there will be no control relations. Within hierarchies people lower down will be controlled by some, though not necessarily all, of the people above them. No one higher in the hierarchy will be controlled by anyone lower.
If the relation C associated with an equilibrium is hierarchical, the equilibrium will be Pareto optimal. Proof is given in the mathematical appendix. It should be pointed out that the situation in which no one constrains anyone else is included in this theorem. In this case each person is satisfied with the amount of time he spends with the others. Each person is his own hierarchy and the C matrix is trivially acyclic. In-both the Becker marriage model and the time model, as in the collective decision problem, there needs to be some type of consistency in people's preferences in order to obtain efficient equilibria. In particular, preferences that are cyclic in structure either prohibit the existence of equilibria or prevent them from being Pareto optimal. Becker's simple marriage model by assumption prohibits cyclic preferences. The way it does so may well be very plausible. The assumptions that he constructs, however, need to be much more fully explored.
BECKER'S MARRIAGE MODEL

NETWORK MODELS
The model presented in this chapter differs considerably from the usual graph-theory models that dominate social network theory. The typical approach in networks has been to assume that relationships should form certain patterns. This theme is found in balance theory (Cartwright and Harary, 1956; Heider, 1958) ; its extension in the work of Davis, Holland, and Leinhardt (Davis, 1967 (Davis, , 1970 Davis and Leinhardt, 1972; Holland and Leinhardt, 1970 , 1971 , 1972 , 1973 , 1975a , 1975b , 1976 Table 2 . What is interesting about the two equilibria shown is that the roles of people are reversed. In the first equilibrium, persons 1 and 4 are at unconstrained optima: i?If, starting at any point, a process converges to the same equilibrium, that equilibrium is said to be globally stable. Person 3 Within the model we have also specified a dynamic process in terms of how people allocate their time. The process is admittedly a crude one, but it leaves much room for elaboration and further work. Dynamic models are new to sociometry (see Holland, and Leinhardt, 1977, for example, and Hunter, 1974), and it is a strength of this model that it already includes one. The fact that we assume that people's preferences are given weakens the applicability of the dynamics we have described. This assumption is adequate if we are looking at a group that has been together for a while. In the case where we are trying to examine how relationships form from the beginning of the group, the description is much less adequate. We must assume that people have certain preferences for spending time with each other even before they meet. This seems to relegate people's preferences to personality. We also need to show that an equilibrium is Pareto optimal if the relation C associated with it is acyclic. Theorem: If the relation C' associated with an equilibrium is acyclic, then the equilibrium is Pareto optimal.
Proof. If C is acyclic there will be a set of people po who are not controlled by anyone: the people at the top of the hierarchy. For these people the equilibrium allocation X, represents a global maximum. By quasi concavity this maximum must be unique. Thus there is no other allocation these people would prefer or be indifferent to relative to X. Then for i an element o, X,j = Xi, for allj. Now consider the set of all the other people (N-Yo). We have already determined how they have allocated their time to the people in To. Consider the set of people who are constrained only by those people in lo. Call these people Y1. In terms of how these people allocate the rest of their time to those not in Yo they are at a global (unconstrained) maximum. By quasi concavity the maximum will be unique. Thus for i an element of Y1, X,i = X,i for all '. We can continue with this procedure by choosing Y2, then f3, and so on until we have included everyone in the group. Thus X must be Pareto optimal.
